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Studies using an Information Integration approach have shown that children
from four years have a good intuitive understanding of probability and
expected value. Experience of skill-related uncertainty may provide one
naturalistic opportunity to develop this intuitive understanding. To test the
viability of this view, 16 5- and 16 7-year-olds played a marble rolling game
in which size of the target and distance from it varied factorially. Task
difficulty judgements (prior to practical experience with the game) reflected
both objective task structure and subsequent performance for both age groups.
Children then judged how happy they would be playing games of variable
difficulty for different prizes. These judgements had the multiplicative
structure predicted by the normative expected value model, again for both age
groups. Thus children can use task difficulties as estimates of personal success
probability in skill-related tasks. Our findings therefore extend previous work
on early probability understanding from games of chance to games of skill.
The ability to evaluate personal success probability is important for efficient
behaviour in situations of uncertainty. The present study investigates how
young children evaluate success probabilities and utilities of outcomes in
situations that depend on skill, in order to learn more about the natural
sources of early intuitive probability understanding.
Contrary to traditional theory (Hoemann & Ross, 1982; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1958, 1975), recent work using an Information Integration
approach (Anderson, 1981, 1982, 1991, 1996) has shown that children from
4 years of age have good intuitive understanding of probability and expected
value (EV) (see review in Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2010, in press). For
instance, children’s judgements (on a continuous graphic scale) of how easy
it is to randomly draw a blue winner marble from a plate with blue and black
marbles vary appropriately with the number of winners and losers. More
importantly, the barrel-shaped pattern of judgements corresponds to the
predictions of the normative probability ratio model (Anderson &
Schlottmann, 1991; also see Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks, & Horobin, 1989;
Wilkening & Anderson, 1991). Similarly, children’s judgements of how
good it is to play a game of chance for a prize vary appropriately with the
1Department of Psychology, University of Winchester, Sparkford Road, Winchester, SO22
4NR, Email: sarah.bayless@anapoda.co.uk; 2Division of Psychology & Language Sciences,
University College London, Gower Street, WC1E 6BT, Email: a.schlottmann@ucl.ac.uk.
S. Bayless & A. Schlottmann2
likelihood of winning and size of the prize. Crucially, the judgements follow
a fan-shaped pattern, which corresponds to the predictions of the normative
model in which EV is defined as the product of probability and value
(Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann & Tring,
2005). Because the structure of children’s judgements is so close to
appropriate formal models, they cannot easily be discounted as non-
probabilistic. Instead these findings highlight a genuine intuitive probability
competence.
The studies demonstrating this intuitive competence have typically
used tasks which involve simple games of chance, like the random draw of a
marble or spinning of a roulette wheel. Young children have little
experience with such devices, so it is remarkable that they can reason about
probability in these unfamiliar contexts. Furthermore, it is quite unlikely that
that they learned about probability in these contexts. Instead, everyday
experiences of uncertainty at achieving desired outcomes may play an
important part in developing this intuitive understanding.
Uncertainty may be particularly salient for children in skill-related
tasks. Young children are beginning learners of most skills who will
experience over and over again that task achievement is not guaranteed.
They may fall off their scooter or stay on, may read the correct word or a
substitute, their ball may hit or miss the target. The contexts in which
children learn about their own performance and its determinants (effort, skill
and objective difficulty factors) also provide opportunities to learn about
success probability and its implication for outcome. Children’s intuitive
probability competence is easier to understand if we consider that they may
learn in such everyday scenarios which bear little resemblance to the lottery-
style tasks typically considered in the judgment-decision literature. The goal
of the present study is to investigate whether and how young children assess
subjective success probabilities in a skill-dependent task.
The issue of how young children assess and predict
performance/ability has been studied before in the areas of memory
monitoring (Schneider & Pressley, 1997) and achievement motivation
(Stipek, 1984; Stipek & MacIver, 1989). Both lines of work found that
young children typically overestimate their performance, gradually
becoming more realistic over the school years. This has been attributed to a
number of factors: deficient monitoring (Flavell, 1979), overweighting of
effort (Wellmann, 1985), non-differentiation of effort and ability (Nicholls,
1978) or non-differentiation of wishes and expectations (Schneider, 1998;
Stipek, 1984). Regardless of the precise explanation, unrealistic optimism
may boost children’s motivation to practice and improve their skills
(Schneider, 1998).
Only one study (Schneider, Hanne, & Lehmann, 1989) has related
children’s performance expectations to their experiences of uncertainty.
From 3 years, children discriminated between difficulty levels in a box-
lifting task, with no overestimation of success. Subjective feelings of
uncertainty were indicated by children taking longer to make verbal
predictions for more uncertain task levels, and approaching these faster than
task levels in which success/failure was relatively certain. Similar findings
appeared for a marble-rolling task, but children discriminated less between
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difficulty levels and overestimated their success. Schneider et al. (1989)
argue that more experience with lifting objects than rolling marbles at
younger ages might account for more realistic expectations in the box-lifting
task. Here we aim to extend these findings.
The present study addresses two issues. First, we investigated
children’s judgements of task difficulty in a more complex situation in
which difficulty varied along two dimensions simultaneously. Second, we
wanted to determine how children’s judgements of difficulty correspond to
objective success probability, and whether these judgements directly reflect
estimates of personal success probability. If so, then children should be able
to incorporate task difficulty into EV judgements.
Children were invited to help a puppet play a “shoot the marble
through the gate game” in which gate size and distance from the start line
varied (see Figure 1). Children first judged the difficulty of each game
combination, then played all games, and finally judged how happy the
puppet would be playing some games, with difficulty level and size of the
prize varied. The latter task is an adaptation of a standard EV task for
children (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001).
METHOD
Participants. Thirty-five children took part in the experiment; three
were eliminated due to not understanding the task or not paying attention.
There were 16 children in the younger age group (range =5,4-6,2, mean age
= 5,8); and 16 children in the older age group (range = 6,6–8,2, mean age =
7,5). Children were volunteers from two London primary schools, attended
by predominantly white children from middle-class homes.
Materials. The marble game was played on a 60x60cm mat with a
start line and three distances (20cm, 40cm, 60cm) marked. Three gates
(internal width 2.5cm, 4.5cm, and 6.5cm, marked by different symbols to
facilitate discrimination) could be placed at these distances (see Figure 1).
Two further gates of 1cm and 7.5cm width were used as anchors. Children
were given 3 identical marbles of 1.5cm diameter to play. The prizes were
small, medium or large bags of M&M candies, laid out next to a gate during
the EV judgements.
Children’s judgements were made on a graphic response scale,
consisting of 17 wooden dowels increasing in height from 2.5 to 18.5cm,
with each stick 1cm taller than the previous one. Children pointed to a stick
to indicate how difficult a game would be, or how happy they would be.
Bigger sticks corresponded to greater difficulty, or for EV judgements, to
better games. Even 4-year-olds can successfully use this scale (Anderson &
Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994).
Scale usage was elicited in the standard way by instruction with end anchors
(Anderson, 1982, chapter 1).
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Figure 1. Materials for the marble-rolling task. (Children helped “Hilda
Hippo” roll the marble through one of three gates (an anchor gate is
also shown). Gates were set up in the centre of the mat at one of the
three marked distances and the marble was rolled from the white start
line. Bags of M&M candies served as prizes for the EV game. Children
made both difficulty and EV judgements on the stick scale on the left.)
Design. The design for the task difficulty judgements and for the
subsequent performance task was a 3 gate size x 3 distance within subjects
factorial. Children first judged two individually randomized replications of
the 9 game combinations, then had three attempts with the marble for each,
also in a random sequence. The design for the final EV task was a 3 game
(large gate/20cm, medium gate/40cm, small gate/60cm) x 3 prize within
subjects factorial. Children again judged two individually randomized
replications. Age was a between subjects factor.
Procedure. Children were tested individually in a single session at
their school. First the puppet showed the child the marble game and asked
the child to help her play. The large anchor gate was placed at the 40cm line
and children were encouraged to roll the marble through this gate from the
starting line. This was repeated with the small anchor gate. Children then
sorted all gates according to difficulty. Following this two identical large
anchor gates were placed at the closest and furthest line and children were
asked to indicate the easier game. Children had no difficulties with this.
The stick scale was now introduced, with long sticks for good (easy)
games, short sticks for bad (hard) games, and medium sticks for ok (not too
hard, not too easy) games. The largest stick was associated with the easiest
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game (large anchor at 20 cm). The smallest stick was associated with the
hardest game (small anchor at 60 cm). Pictures of the easy and hard games
were placed beside the corresponding ends of the scale throughout the
session. Children were shown an easy, medium and hard game and asked to
point to a corresponding stick to ensure understanding. The 18 experimental
trials followed.
Following the judgements, children were asked which of three gate-
distance combinations (Large/20, Medium/40, Small/60) they would like to
play first. Responses on 3 rolls for the chosen game were recorded, followed
by three rolls for each of the other eight games, presented in a random order.
The expected value task was presented subsequently. Children were
told that the puppet might now win a prize if the marble rolled through the
gate, and the M&M prizes were shown. The easy anchor game was paired
with the largest prize and the difficult anchor game with no prize. Children
indicated the better and worse game. They were then instructed to point to a
stick to show how good each game was. Pictures of the anchor games were
placed by the corresponding scale end and children were reminded to use all
sticks so they could evaluate in-between games. The 18 experimental trials
followed. The session was concluded by asking children to choose one game
combination to play for a sticker prize that they would keep.
RESULTS
Mean judgements of difficulty, task performance and judgements of
expected value made by 5- and 7-year olds are presented in Figure 2. These
data were submitted to mixed model ANOVAs. Greenhouse-Geisser
adjusted degrees of freedom are reported as appropriate.
Task Difficulty Judgements. Children’s judgements of task
difficulty prior to experience with the task are shown in the top panel of
Figure 2. Results of the 3 (Gate Size) x 3(Gate Distance) x 2(Age) ANOVA
indicate a main effect of gate size F(1.41, 42.34)=100.83, p<0.001 and
distance F(2,60)=30.18, p<0.001, but no interaction, F(4,120)=4.23, ns. The
only significant effect involving age was the gate size x age interaction,
F(1.41, 42.34)=5.80, p<0.05, with a larger effect of gate size for 7- than 5-
year-olds, as seen in steeper slopes in the right panel.
Individual subject analyses confirmed that children considered both
factors in their judgements. In single subject Anovas (p<0.1), 11 of 16 5-
year-olds showed a main effect of gate size, nine of distance, six showed
both main effects and four showed interactions. For 7-year-olds, all showed
a main effect of gate size, nine of distance, nine showed both, and four
showed interactions. That few 5-year-olds showed statistical main effects of
both variables is due to low power. If either statistically reliable or sizable
main effects (means difference 3 points or more) are considered, then 9 5
and 9 7-year-olds show effects of both gate size and distance.
Performance. Children’s success in rolling the marble was similarly
affected by both gate size and distance, F(2,60)=9.59, p<0.001 and
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F(2,60)=30.18, p<0.001, respectively, (see middle panel of Figure 2). Thus
the structure of the subjective difficulty ratings considered above reflects the
objective success probabilities. Despite the irregularity in the bottom line of
the performance data (presumably due to the limited number of attempts
with each combination), the interaction was not significant, F(4,120)=1.14,
nor were there significant effects involving age, F(2,60)<1.
Figure 2. Mean task difficulty judgements (top panels), performance
(middle) and EV judgements (bottom) for two age groups. (Difficulty
judgements and performance are shown as a function of gate size
(horizontal) and distance (curve factor); EV judgements are shown as a
function of gate size/distance combination (horizontal) and prize (curve
factor). Higher scores indicate easier games, better performance and
better games. Effects of both factors appear clearly in all panels, but
while the pattern for difficulty judgements and actual performance is
near-parallel, EV judgements show the expected normative fan-shape
pattern.)
To evaluate quantitative accuracy of the subjective difficulty ratings,
we compared these ratings with task performance using a 3(gate size) x
3(distance) x 2(task) x 2(age) mixed model Anova. There was no main
effect of Task F<1, i.e., there was no overall overestimation of success. The
only significant effect involving task was the gate size x task interaction,
F(2,60)=23.99, p<0.001. All other effects were non-significant F<3.12,
p>0.62, except the expected main effects of gate size and distance, F>64.
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The mean judgements and performance data for gate size, distance
and task (collapsed across ages, and with both judgements and performance
re-scaled to %) are presented in Table 1. Inspection of these means indicated
that regardless of distance, children underestimated the difficulty for the
largest gate (greater mean judgements compared to performance), gave
reasonably accurate estimations of difficulty for the medium sized gate, and
overestimated difficulty of the smallest gate (lower mean judgements
compared to performance).
Table 1: Mean judgement and performance scores for each gate size
and distance combination. N.B. judgement scores are rescaled from 1-
14 to 1-100 to align with the performance scores.
Judgement Performance
20cm 91.26 76.04
Large 40cm 70.28 60.42
60cm 61.92 42.72
Mean 74.49 59.73
20cm 68.17 69.80
Medium 40cm 53.55 47.92
60cm 44.40 48.96
Mean 55.37 55.56
20cm 41.06 57.29
Small 40cm 23.87 44.79
60cm 9.04 29.16
Mean 24.66 43.75
Grand Mean 51.51 53.01
Expected Value Judgements. Mean expected value judgements
were submitted to a 3(Game Difficulty) x 3(Size of Prize) x 2(Age) mixed
model ANOVA. There were significant main effects of difficulty F(1.53,
45.92)=54.36, p<0.001 and prize F(1.34, 40.27)=35.16, p<0.001.
Importantly, the interaction between gate and prize was also significant
F(3.65, 109.50)=3.37, p<0.05, with a linear x linear component,
F(1,30)=12.77, p<0.01, reflecting the fan-shaped pattern in the lower panels
of Figure 1; there were no other significant effects, all F<1. The shape of the
difficulty x prize interaction indicates that children’s judgement follows the
multiplicative pattern predicted by the formal EV model.
Individual Anovas revealed that 11 of the 5-year-olds showed a main
effect of difficulty, seven of prize, two showed both main effects and one a
significant interaction. Eleven of the 7-year-olds showed a main effect of
difficulty, 12 of prize, six showed both main effects and three an interaction.
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Despite few children showing a significant interaction, 10 5-year-olds and
eight 7-year-olds showed the predicted fan shape in the data (with the game
effect more than two points larger for the most desirable prize than the least
desirable prize). Thus the individual analyses agreed with the impression
from the group data that the structure of children’s judgements corresponds
to the predictions of the EV model.
Choices. When choosing which game to try first at the beginning of
the performance task, 11 5- and 10 7-year-olds opted for the easiest game
(large gate at 20 cm distance), the remainder were split between the two
more challenging options. When choosing which game to play for a real
sticker prize at the very end of the session, even more children, 12 5- and 14
7-year-olds opted for the easiest game, and none of the remainder chose the
most difficult option (small gate at 60 cm). This shift towards the easiest
game was significant (z=-2.06, p=.40, Wilcoxon, collapsed over age).
DISCUSSION
In this study, young children’s difficulty judgements in a skill-
dependent game reflected both objective task structure, and corresponded
reasonably well to success probability. Moreover, the pattern of children’s
happiness judgements when games were paired with prizes agreed well with
the formal EV model.
Judgements of Task Difficulty and Performance. In the first part
of the study, 5- and 7-year-olds made realistic judgements of the difficulty
of games with different gate-size/distance combinations prior to practical
experience with the games. These findings extend those of Schneider et al.
(1989) who demonstrated that 3- to 6-year-olds can make systematic
predictions of success on physical tasks when given objective cues to
difficulty.
Comparison of judgements with performance showed that children
were realistic about the effects of distance, but not gate size, on task
difficulty: They overestimated their success for the largest gate, and
underestimated it for the smallest gate. Unrealistic optimism in children’s
predictions of performance has been reported when stimuli varied uni-
dimensionally (e.g. Schneider, 1998; Stipek, 1984; Wellmann, 1985). In the
present two-dimensional task the picture was more complicated, with one
dimension assessed realistically, while the other was assigned too much
weight.
It is not entirely clear how to best model task difficulty, which
depends on the physical structure and on the child’s action systems. A major
factor is the precision of the aim needed, a function of the ratio of gate size
to distance. This predicts a multiplicative pattern, but performance was
additive. This could reflect the small number of trials, or distance might
contribute significantly in a second way. For example, deviations from the
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initial trajectory due to surface irregularities increase with distance, or the
more forceful push needed may make the aim harder to control.
Children’s judgements, at any rate, may simply rely on the multi-
purpose addition rule proposed by Anderson and Cuneo (1978), reflecting
their recognition that both dimensions are relevant, without clear
understanding of physical structure and situation-specific parameters.
Further work on developmental changes in judgment, performance and
understanding at older ages is desirable.
Why children focus too much on the role of gate size is unclear.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that children believed they could push the
marble harder to make up for it having to roll further, but they did not report
compensation beliefs for small gates. Alternatively gate size may be more
salient for children than distance, as the explicit goal was to roll the marble
through the gate. Further work is necessary on this issue as well. But despite
these open questions, the main point is that children’s difficulty judgements
were qualitatively consistent with physical task structure, and on the whole
well calibrated with actual performance.
Task Difficulty and Expected Value. In the second part of the
study, children evaluated games for M&M prizes. The resulting data pattern
corresponded closely to the multiplicative predictions of the formal EV
model. This extends previous work on children’s EV concepts from games
of chance to games of skill.
The multiplicative nature of children’s EV judgements in
probabilistic games is remarkable because in intuitive physics children make
additive judgements for multiplicative concepts until around age 8.
Multiplication may be more difficult when it involves a conjunction of two
dimensions to form a third (e.g., length x width = area) than when one
dimension merely weights another (e.g., probability x value = expected
value) (see Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2010, in press). Such weighting
effects appear to extend beyond the domain of formal probability.
Traditional theory saw probability understanding as late emerging.
However, while children’s computational accuracy increases as they grow
older, good structural understanding at an intuitive level appears from pre-
school age, prior to formal instruction (see review in Schlottmann &
Wilkening, 2010, in press). This agrees with Fischbein's (1975) view that
probability intuitions are adaptive in this uncertain world and thus likely to
emerge early. In fact, Teglas, Girotto, Gonzalez and Bonatti (2007; also see
Xu & Garcia, 2008) argue for probability understanding from infancy.
The present results provide a first demonstration that unorthodox,
but natural probabilities may be co-opted into children’s developing
probability concepts. Differentiated judgements of task difficulty show that
information about skill-related success probability is available to children.
EV judgements incorporating these task difficulties go further to show that
they use this information in probabilistic reasoning. Thus our results suggest
one mechanism through which probability understanding might develop
without experience with formal probability: It might be a corollary of skill
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learning. There may be yet other sources of a natural probability
understanding.
Finally, children’s choices also fit with EV and achievement
motivation theory. At two points in the study, children chose which game to
play: At the very end, most chose the highest EV option. On the initial
performance trial, when no prize was at stake, children significantly more
often chose a more difficult game, in line with the view that they, like adults,
are often motivated to try tasks when they are uncertain whether they can
succeed (Schneider et al., 1989). These choices underscore children’s sound
understanding: They were motivated to play games high in intrinsic
motivation in the absence of a prize, but high in EV when playing for a prize.
Experience of personal success probability could be a precursor to
probability understanding in formal, lottery-style situations. However,
understanding of lottery-style probabilities appears from at least 4 years of
age (Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann & Christoforou, in prep.).
It remains to be seen whether skill-related probability intuitions appears
even earlier. Regardless, studies of skill-dependent and other unorthodox
probabilities provide a promising new approach to the study of children’s
emerging probability understanding.
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